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Abstract
We propose a portfolio selection model based on a class of prefer-
ences that coincide with mean-variance preferences on their domain
of monotonicity, but diﬀer where mean-variance preferences fail to be
monotone.
1 Introduction
Since Markowitz’s ([M]) seminal paper on portfolio selection, mean-variance
preferences have been extensively used to model the behavior of economic
∗The views expressed in the article are those of the author and do not involve the
responsibility of the bank.
1agents choosing among uncertain prospects. These preferences, denoted by







where P is a given probability measure and θ is an index of the agent’s
uncertainty aversion.
The success of such a speciﬁcation of preferences is due to its analytical
tractability and clear intuitive meaning. Mean-variance preferences have,
however, a major theoretical drawback: they may fail to be monotone. It
may happen that an agent with mean-variance preferences strictly prefers
less to more, thus violating one of the most compelling principles of economic
rationality.
This is a well known problem, which can be illustrated with a simple
example. Consider a mean-variance agent with θ =2 . Suppose she has to
choose among the two following prospects f and g:
States of Nature s1 s2 s3 s4
Probabilities 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Payoﬀ to act f 1234
Payoﬀ to act g 1235
Prospect g yields a strictly higher payoﬀ than f in every state. Any rational
agent should prefer g to f. However, it turns out that our mean-variance
agent strictly prefers f to g.I nf a c t :
U2 (f)=1 .25 > 0.5625 = U2 (g).
The reason why monotonicity fails here is fairly intuitive. By choosing g
rather than f,t h ep a y o ﬀ in state s4 increases by one unit. This additional
unit increases the mean payoﬀ, but it also makes the distribution of payoﬀs
more spread out, thus increasing the variance. The increase in the mean is
more than compensated by the increase in the variance, and this makes our
mean-variance agent worse oﬀ.
In this paper we propose an adjusted version of mean-variance preferences
that satisﬁes monotonicity, based on Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini
[MMR-1] and [MMR-2]. As it will be detailed in the next section, they
2axiomatize a class of preferences, called variational preferences, that includes
as a special case the preferences ºmmv represented by the choice functional









, ∀f ∈ L
2 (P),
where Q ranges over all probability measures with square-integrable density
with respect to P,a n dC (Q||P) is the relative Gini concentration index, a
concentration index that enjoys properties similar to those of the relative
entropy (see the next section for details). Unlike mean-variance preferences,
the preferences ºmmv are monotone.
Consider the domain of monotonicity Gθ of mean-variance preferences,
that is, the set of prospects on which they are monotone. The set Gθ is
where mean-variance preferences are economically meaningful. [MMR-1] and
















, ∀f ∈ Gθ.
Moreover, they show that Vθ is the minimal monotone choice functional that
extends the mean-variance functional Uθ outside the domain of monotonicity
G,a n dt h a tVθ pointwise dominates Uθ.
The preferences ºmmv have, therefore, the following key properties:
• They agree with mean-variance preferences where mean-variance pref-
erences are economically meaningful.
• Their choice functional Vθ is the minimal, and so the most cautious,
monotone functional that extends the mean-variance functional outside
its domain of monotonicity.
• The functional Vθ is also the best best possible monotone approximation
of Uθ:i fV 0
θ is any other monotone extension of Uθ outside Gθ,t h e n
|Vθ (f) − Uθ (f)| ≤ |V
0
θ (f) − Uθ (f)|
for each prospect f.
3These properties make the preferences ºmmv a natural adjusted version
of mean-variance preferences that satisﬁes monotonicity. For this reason we
call them monotone mean-variance preferences.
In view of all this, it is natural to wonder what happens in a portfolio
problem à la Markowitz if we use monotone mean-variance preferences in
place of standard mean-variance preferences. This is the main subject matter
















mv is the optimal portfolio of risky assets, X is the vector of gross
returns on the risky assets, R is the gross return on the risk-free asset, and
~ 1 is a vector of 1s. Our main result, Theorem 3, shows that with monotone





θP (W ≤ κ)
Var




X −~ 1R|W ≤ κ
i
,
where W is future wealth and κ is a constant determined along with α∗
mmv
by solving a suitable system of equations.
Except for a scaling factor, the diﬀerence between Markowitz’s optimal
portfolio α∗
mv and the above portfolio α∗
mmv is that in the latter conditional
moments of asset returns EQ[·|W ≤ κ] and Var
Q[·|W ≤ κ] are used instead
of unconditional moments, so that the allocation α∗
mmv ignores the part of
the distribution of X where wealth is higher than κ.A sar e s u l t ,am o n o t o n e
mean-variance agent does not take into account those high payoﬀ states which
contribute to increase the mean return, but give an even greater contribution
to increase the variance. By doing so, this agent does not incur in violations
of monotonicity caused for mean-variance preferences by an exaggerate pe-
nalization of “positive deviations from the mean”.
This is a key feature of monotone mean-variance preferences, which we
illustrate in Section 5 by showing how it avoids some pathological situations
in which the more the payoﬀ to an asset is increased in some states, the more
a mean-variance agent reduces the quantity of it in her portfolio, until in the
limit she ends up holding none.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates in detail monotone
mean-variance preferences. Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal allocation
4rule under the proposed speciﬁcation of preferences. Section 5 presents some
examples to illustrate the diﬀerence between the optimal allocation rule pro-
posed here and Markowitz’s. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Monotone Mean-Variance Preferences
We consider a measurable space (S,Σ) of states of nature. An uncertain
prospect is a Σ-measurable real valued function f : S → R,t h a ti s ,as t o -
chastic monetary payoﬀ.
The agent’s preferences are described by a binary relation º on a set of
uncertain prospects. [MMR-1] provides a set of simple behavioral conditions
that guarantee the existence of a utility function u : R → R a n da nu n c e r -
tainty index c : ∆ → [0,∞] on the set ∆ of all probability measures, such
that










Q [u(g)] + c(Q)
ª
(1)
for all (simple) prospects f,g.
Preferences having such a representation are called variational,a n dt w o
important special cases of variational preferences are the multiple priors pref-
erences of Gilboa and Schmeidler [GS], obtained when c only takes on values
0 and ∞, and the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent [HS], ob-
tained when c(Q) is proportional to the relative entropy of Q with respect
to a ﬁxed probability measure P.1 Variational preferences satisfy the basic
tenets of economic rationality. In particular, they are monotone, that is,
given any two prospects f and g,w eh a v ef º g whenever f (s) º g(s) for
each s ∈ S.
For concreteness, given a probability measure P on (S,Σ),w ec o n s i d e r
the set L2 (P) of all square integrable uncertain prospects. A mean-variance
preference relation ºmv on L2 (P) is represented by the choice functional














if Q ¿ P and ∞ otherwise.
5with θ > 0.L e tGθ be the domain of monotonicity of the preference ºmv,t h a t
is, the subset of L2 (P) where ºmv is monotone. Formally, Gθ is the convex
set where the Gateaux diﬀerential of Uθ is positive (as a linear functional).










As we discussed in the Introduction, the domain of monotonicity Gθ is where
the mean-variance preference ºmv is economically meaningful. [MMR-1] and
[MMR-2] show that the restriction of ºmv to Gθ is a variational preference,
and that









, ∀f ∈ Gθ,
where ∆2 (P) is the set of all probability measures with square-integrable








− 1 if Q ¿ P,
∞ otherwise.
Along with the Shannon entropy, the Gini index is the most classic con-
centration index. For discrete distributions it is given by
Pn
i=1 Q2
i − 1,a n d
C (Q||P) is its continuous and relative version. [MMR-2] studies in detail the
properties of C (Q||P), which turn out to be similar to those of the relative
entropy.
Now, say that a preference is a monotone mean-variance preference,w r i t -
ten ºmmv, if it is represented by the choice functional Vθ : L2 (P) → R given
by









, ∀f ∈ L
2 (P), (2)
where θ > 0. [MMR-2] proves the following result:
Theorem 1 The functional Vθ : L2 (P) → R given by (2) is the minimal
monotone functional on L2 (P) such that Vθ (f)=Uθ (f) for all f ∈ Gθ; that
is,
Vθ (f)=s u p{Uθ (g):g ∈ Gθ and g 6 f}, ∀f ∈ L
2 (P). (3)
Moreover, Vθ (f) ≥ Uθ (f) for each f ∈ L2 (P).
6The functional Vθ is concave, continuous, and in view of this theorem it
has the following fundamental properties:
(i) Vθ coincides with the mean-variance choice functional Uθ on its domain
of monotonicity Gθ;
(ii) Vθ is the minimal monotone extension of Uθ outside the domain of
monotonicity Gθ, and so it is the most cautious monotone adjustment
of the mean-variance choice functional.
(iii) Vθ is the best possible monotone approximation of Uθ:i fV 0
θ is any other
monotone extension of Uθ outside the domain of monotonicity Gθ,t h e n
|Vθ (f) − Uθ (f)| ≤ |V
0
θ (f) − Uθ (f)|, ∀f ∈ L
2 (P).
In view of (i)-(iii), the monotone choice functional Vθ provides a natural
adjustment of the mean-variance choice functional. It also has the remarkable
feature of involving, like multiplier preferences ([HS]), a classic concentration
index. This ensures to Vθ a good analytical tractability, as it will be seen in
the next section.
The next theorem further illustrates the nature of Vθ.
Theorem 2 Let f ∈ L2 (P).T h e n :
Vθ (f)=
½
Uθ (f) if f ∈ Gθ,
Uθ (f ∧ κf) else,
where
κf =m a x{t ∈ R : f ∧ t ∈ Gθ}. (4)
A monotone mean-variance agent can thus be regarded as still using the
mean-variance functional Uθ even in evaluating prospects outside the domain
of monotonicity Gθ. In this case, however, the agent no longer considers the
original prospects, but rather their truncations at κf, the largest constant t
such that f ∧ t belongs to Gθ.
Observe that, besides depending on the given act f,t h ec o n s t a n tκf also
depends on the parameter θ. Corollary 9 in Appendix provides an explicit
formula for κf,w h i c hs h o w st h a tκf becomes lower when θ increases.
73 The Portfolio Selection Problem
We now present the static portfolio choice problem we are going to study.
We consider the one-period allocation problem of an agent who has to decide
how to invest a unit of wealth at time 0, dividing it among n+1assets. The
ﬁrst n assets are risky, while the (n +1 ) -th is risk-free. The gross return
on the i-th asset after one period is denoted by Xi.T h e (n × 1) vector of
the returns on the ﬁrst n assets is denoted by X and the (n × 1) vector of
portfolio weights, indicating the fraction of wealth invested in each of the
ﬁrst n assets, is denoted by α. The return on the (n +1 ) -th asset is risk-free,
and so equal to a constant R.
The end-of-period wealth Wα induced by a choice of α is given by:





We assume that there are no frictions of any kind: securities are perfectly
divisible; there are no transaction costs or taxes; agents are price-takers, in
that they believe that their choices do not aﬀect the distribution of asset
returns; there are no institutional restrictions, so that agents are allowed to
buy, sell or short sell any desired amount of any security.2 As a result, α can
be chosen in Rn.
We adopt ºmmv as a speciﬁcation of preferences, and so portfolios α are
ranked according to the preference functional:










where P is the reference probability measure. Hence, the portfolio problem












4T h e O p t i m a l P o r t f o l i o
In this section we give a solution to the portfolio selection problem outlined
in the previous section. The characterization of the optimal portfolio is given
2This assumption can be weakened, by simply requiring that at an optimum institu-
tional restrictions are not binding.
8by the following theorem.3
Theorem 3 The vector α∗ is a solution of the portfolio selection problem
if and only if there exists κ∗ ∈ R such that (α∗,κ∗) satisﬁes the system of
equations:
(
θP (Wα ≤ κ)V ar P [X |Wα ≤ κ]α =E P
h
X −~ 1R|Wα ≤ κ
i
,
P (Wα ≤ κ)
¡




The optimal portfolio α∗ is thus determined along with the threshold κ∗
by solving a system of n +1equations in n +1unknowns. Although it is
not generally possible to ﬁnd explicitly a solution of the above system of
equations, numerical calculation with a standard equation solver is straight-
forward: given an initial guess (α,κ), one is able to calculate the ﬁrst two
moments of the conditional distribution of wealth; if the moments thus calcu-
lated, together with the initial guess (α,κ), satisfy the system of equations,
then (α,κ)=( α∗,κ∗) and numerical search stops; otherwise, the search pro-
cedure continues with a new initial guess for the parameters.4 In the next
Section we will solve in this way few simple portfolio problems in order to
illustrate some features of the model.
The optimal allocation rule of Theorem 3 is easily compared to the rule
that would obtain in a classic Markowitz’s setting. In the traditional mean-
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which is easily compared to Markowitz’s optimal allocation. The uncondi-
tional mean and variance of the vector of returns X are replaced by a condi-
tional mean and a conditional variance, both calculated by conditioning on
3EP [·|Wα ≤ κ] and Var
P [·|Wα ≤ κ] are the expectation and variance conditional on
the event {Wα ≤ κ}.N o t et h a tVar
P [·|Wα ≤ κ] is an (n × n) matrix.
4A R (S-Plus) routine to calculate the optimal portfolio in an economy with ﬁnitely
many states of nature and assets is available upon request from the authors.
9the event {Wα∗ ≤ κ∗}. Furthermore a scaling factor is introduced, which is
inversely proportional to the probability of exceeding the threshold κ∗.T o
close the system, an extra equation is added to determine the threshold κ∗.
Roughly speaking, when computing the optimal portfolio we ignore that
part of the distribution of X where wealth is higher than κ∗. To see why
it is optimal to ignore the part of the distribution of X where one obtains
the highest returns, recall the example of non-monotonicity of mean-variance
illustrated in the Introduction. In that example, high payoﬀsw e r ei n c r e a s i n g
t h ev a r i a n c em o r et h a nt h em e a n ,t h u sl e a d i n gt h em e a n - v a r i a n c ea g e n tt o
prefer a strictly smaller prospect, contrary to what would commonly be re-
puted economically reasonable. With monotone mean-variance preferences,
this kind of behavior is avoided by artiﬁcially setting the probability of some
high payoﬀ states equal to zero. In our portfolio selection problem we set the
probability of the event {Wα∗ > κ∗} equal to zero.
When there is only one risky asset, the optimal quantity of it to be held
according to our model and according to the mean-variance model can be
compared by means of the following result. Here α∗
mmv denotes the opti-
mal portfolio according to the monotone mean-variance model and α∗
mv the
optimal portfolio according to the mean-variance model.
Proposition 4 Suppose that S is ﬁnite, with P (s) > 0 for all s ∈ S,a n d































In the presence of only one risky asset, an investor with monotone mean-
variance preferences always holds a portfolio which is more aggressive than
the portfolio held by a mean-variance investor. If she buys a positive quan-
tity of the risky asset, this is greater than or equal to the quantity that would
be bought by a mean-variance investor; on the contrary, if she sells the risky
10asset short, she sells more or as much as a mean-variance investor would
do. This kind of behavior will be thoroughly illustrated by the examples in
the next section: the intuition behind it is that in some cases a favorable
investment opportunity is discarded by a mean-variance investor because of
non-monotonicity of her preferences, while a monotone mean-variance in-
vestor exploits the opportunity, thus taking a more leveraged position.
5S o m e E x a m p l e s
In this section we present three simple examples to illustrate the optimal
portfolio rule we derived above. In every example there are ﬁve possible
states of Nature. Each of them obtains with a probability P (si) that remains
ﬁxed throughout the examples. In all examples we also set θ =1 0 .
Example 1 is a case in which our model and the traditional mean-variance
model deliver the same optimal composition of the portfolio. This is not
interesting per se, but it serves as a benchmark and it helps to introduce
E x a m p l e2 ,w h e r et h et w oo p t i m a lp o r t f o l i o sd i ﬀer. In Example 1 there is
only one risky asset, whose gross return is denoted by X1 and is reported in
the next table, and a risk-free asset, whose gross return R is equal to 1 across
all states. In this example, the optimal portfolio α∗
mmv calculated according
to to our rule is equal to the mean-variance optimal portfolio α∗
mv. Wmv and
Wmmv represent the overall return to the two optimal portfolios for each state
of the world. The table also displays the value of the constant κ∗ at which it
is optimal to truncate the distribution of the return to the portfolio of risky
assets.
P (si) P (si |Wmmv ≤ κ∗) RX 1 Wmv Wmmv
s1 0.1 0.1 1 0.97 0.9375 0.9375
s2 0.2 0.2 1 0.99 0.9791 0.9791
s3 0.4 0.4 1 1.01 1.0208 1.0208
s4 0.2 0.2 1 1.03 1.0620 1.0620




mmv =2 .083 κ∗ =1 .1211
Example 2 is a slight modiﬁcation of Example 1. We increase the payoﬀ
to the risky asset in state s5 from 1.05 to 1.10, leaving everything else un-
11changed. The eﬀect of this change is an increase in both the mean and the
variance of X1, the payoﬀ to the risky asset. The optimal behavior according
to the mean-variance model is to reduce the fraction of wealth invested in
the risky asset from 2.083 to 1.3574. In contrast, according to our model it is
also optimal to decrease the position in the risky asset, but less, from 2.083
to 1.8382.
P (si) P (si |Wmmv ≤ κ∗) RX 1 Wmv Wmmv
s1 0.10 .1111 1 0.97 0.9592 0.9448
s2 0.20 .2222 1 0.99 0.9864 0.9816
s3 0.40 .4444 1 1.01 1.0135 1.0183
s4 0.20 .2222 1 1.03 1.0407 1.0551




mmv =1 .8382 κ∗ =1 .1213
In both cases the optimal behavior might seem puzzling at a ﬁrst sight:
when the payoﬀ of an asset increases in one state, it is optimal to hold less of
that asset. This behavior can be understood by looking at the distributions
of the overall return in the two tables. By reducing the fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset, the overall return increases in the states where
the risky asset pays less than the risk-free asset. On the contrary, the overall
return decreases in the states where the risky asset pays more than the risk-
free asset. In state s5, however, the eﬀect of this decrease is compensated
b yt h ef a c tt h a tw eh a v er a i s e dt h ep a y o ﬀ to the risky asset from 1.05 to
1.10. Hence, by reducing the amount of wealth invested in the risky asset,
the investor gives up some of the extra payoﬀ received in state s5 in order
to guarantee himself a higher overall return in the states where the risky
asset has a low payoﬀ. The problem with this kind of behavior is that it can
become pathological with mean-variance preferences. The next table shows
what happens if we further increase the payoﬀ in state s5.
X1 (s5)1 .05 1.10 1.15 1.20 1.50 2 3
α∗
mv 2.0830 1.3574 0.9174 0.6747 0.2465 0.1175 0.0572
α∗
mmv 2.0830 1.8382 1.8382 1.8382 1.8382 1.8382 1.8382
12T h em o r ew ei n c r e a s et h ep a y o ﬀ in state s5, the more the mean-variance
optimal fraction α∗
mv of wealth invested in the risky asset decreases, until it
goes to zero when the payoﬀ in state s5 becomes very large. In our model this
does not happen. At ﬁrst α∗
mmv decreases, but it then stops to decrease and
it remains ﬁxed at the same value, though the payoﬀ in state s5 is further
increased. The reason why this happens is that, once probabilities have been
optimally reassigned to states and a zero probability has been assigned to
state s5, any further increases of the payoﬀ in s5 are disregarded and have
no inﬂuence on the formation of the optimal portfolio.
Example 3 is slightly more complicated. Everything is as in Example 2,
but a second risky asset is added. The payoﬀ to this new asset, denoted by
X2, is high in the states where X1 is low and low where X1 is high.
P (si) P (si |Wmmv ≤ κ∗) RX 1 X2 Wmv Wmmv
s1 0.10 .1111 1 0.97 1.05 1.002 1.0231
s2 0.20 .2222 1 0.99 1.00 0.9833 0.9570
s3 0.40 .4444 1 1.01 0.99 1.0061 1.0125
s4 0.20 .2222 1 1.03 0.99 1.0393 1.0985
s5 0.10 1 1 .10 0.99 1.1556 1.3994
α∗
mv =( 1 .6613,1.0495)
α∗
mmv =( 4 .2989,3.0423) κ∗ =1 .1316
Also in this case the optimal portfolios suggested by our model and by the
traditional model are diﬀerent. To get an intuitive idea of what is happening,
note that, although the market is still arbitrage-free, asset 2 allows to hedge
away almost completely the risks taken by investing in asset 1. Consider for
example a portfolio formed by 0.5 units of asset 1 and 0.5 units of asset 2.
Its payoﬀsi nt h eﬁve states are collected in the following vector:
(1.01,0.995,1,1.01,1.045)
A qualitative inspection of this payoﬀ vector reveals that in state s2 this
portfolio pays oﬀ slightly less than the risk-free asset, while in all other states
it pays oﬀ more and in some states considerably more. Roughly speaking, if
it was not for the slightly low payoﬀ in state s2,t h e r ew o u l db ea na r b i t r a g e
opportunity because the portfolio would pay oﬀ more than the risk-free asset
13in every state. As a consequence, we would expect an optimal portfolio
rule to exploit this favorable conﬁguration of payoﬀs by prescribing to take
a highly levered position. As reported in the last table, according to our
model it is optimal to take a highly levered position in the risky assets in
order to exploit this opportunity, at the cost of facing a low payoﬀ in state
s2. In contrast, with the mean-variance model the optimal portfolio is much
less aggressive, and the investor is overly concerned with the unique state in
which the payoﬀ is lower than the payoﬀ to the risk-free asset.
14A Appendix: Proofs
For all f ∈ L(P) deﬁne gf : R → R by
gf (z)=zP (f ≤ z) −
Z
f1{f≤z}dP ∀z ∈ R.
Notice that











= zP (f<z )+zP (f = z) −
Z
{f<z}
fdP − zP (f = z)




for all z ∈ R.
Lemma 5 For all z ∈ R, gf (z)=
R z
−∞ Ff (t)dt.5
Proof. Choose z ∈ R.S i n c ef1{f≤z} =( f ∧ z) − z1{f>z},t h e n
gf (z)=zP (f ≤ z) −
Z
f1{f≤z}dP = zP (f ≤ z) −
Z ¡
f ∧ z − z1{f>z}
¢
dP
= zP (f ≤ z) −
Z
(f ∧ z)dP + z
Z
1{f>z}dP
= zP (f ≤ z)+zP (f>z ) −
Z
(f ∧ z)dP =
Z




z − (f ∧ z)dP. (5)
Observe that z − (f ∧ z) ≥ 0,a n ds o
Z
z − (f ∧ z)dP =
Z ∞
0
P (z − (f ∧ z) ≥ u)du.
5Ff : R →[0,1] is the cumulative distribution function given by Ff (t)=P (f ≤ t) for
each t ∈ R.
15On the other hand, {z − (f ∧ z) ≥ u} = {f ≤ z − u} for all u>0.I nf a c t ,
z − (f ∧ z) ≥ u ⇒ (f ∧ z) ≤ z − u<z⇒ (f ∧ z)=f ⇒ f ≤ z − u
and









P (f ≤ z − u)du =
Z z
−∞
P (f ≤ t)dt,
as desired. ¥




P (f<t )dt, ∀z ∈ R.
Proof. Notice that P (f<t )=l i m u→t− P (f ≤ u) 6= P (f ≤ t) for at most
a countably many ts. ¥
Lemma 7 The function gf is continuous on R,a n d
Ff (z)= l i m
ε→0+
·
gf (z + ε) − gf (z)
ε
¸
, ∀z ∈ R.
That is, Ff is the right derivative of gf,a n dFf (z) is the derivative of gf at
every point z at which Ff is continuous. Moreover, setting ζ = essinf (f),
gf is strictly increasing on (ζ,∞), gf ≡ 0 on (−∞,ζ],6 limz→ζ+ gf (z)=0 +,
and limz→∞ gf (z)=∞.
Proof. The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus guarantees the continuity
and derivability properties of gf. Recall that
essinf (f)=s u p{α ∈ R : P (f<α)=0 }.
6With the convention (−∞,−∞]=∅.
16If z ∈ R and z ≤ essinf (f), for all t<zthere exists α >tsuch that
P (f<α)=0 . Then,
0 ≤ P (f<t ) ≤ P (f<α)=0 .
This implies gf (z)=0for all z ∈ (−∞,ζ].
On the other hand, if ζ <z<z 0,t h e n
gf (z
0) − gf (z)=
Z z0
z
P (f<t )dt ≥ P (f<z )(z
0 − z).
But P (f<z )=0would imply z ≤ ζ, a contradiction. Therefore, gf (z0) −
gf (z) > 0.T h a ti s ,gf is strictly increasing on (ζ,∞).
Notice that limt→∞ Ff (t)=1 . Then, for all n>1 there exists k ≥ 1
(n,k ∈ N) such that Ff (t) > 1 − 1
n for all t ≥ k. Therefore,













= n − 1.
Since gf is increasing on R,t h e nlimz→∞ gf (z)=∞.
If ζ > −∞, gf (ζ)=0 , continuity and nonnegativity imply limz→ζ+ gf (z)=
0+.L e tζ = −∞.B y( 5 ) ,
gf (−n)=
Z
−n − (f ∧ (−n))dP =
Z
((−f) ∨ n) − ndP
=
Z
(−f) − ((−f) ∧ n)dP.
The Monotone Convergence Theorem guarantees that limn→∞ gf (−n)=0 .
Monotonicity and nonnegativity imply limz→ζ+ gT (z)=0 +. ¥
For the rest of the Appendix we will equivalently write EP or just E.
Lemma 8 Let f ∈ L2 (P) − Gθ and t ∈ R.T h e n















=( f − t)1 {f≤t} + gf (t).








i.e., gf (t) ≤ 1
θ ⇒ f ∧ t ∈ Gθ.
For the converse implication, note that we are assuming f/ ∈ Gθ. Then,
being f ∧ t ∈ Gθ,i tc a n n o tb ef ∧ t = f a.s. Hence, essup(f ∧ t)=t.I t
follows that:
f ∧ t − E[f ∧ t] ≤
1
θ

























i.e., f ∧ t ∈ Gθ ⇒ gf (t) ≤ 1
θ. ¥
Lemmas 7 and 8 immediately yield the following:








=m a x{t ∈ R : f ∧ t ∈ Gθ}.




2Var [f] if f ∈ Gθ,
E[f ∧ κ] − θ
2Var [f ∧ κ] else,







. Moreover, the Gateaux diﬀerential of Vθ at f is
∇Vθ (f)=θ(κ − f)1 {f≤κ}.
18Proof. Let f ∈ L2 (P).[ M M R - 2 ]s h o w st h a t























They also observe that the solution of such problem exists, is unique, and it
coincides with the Gateaux derivative of Vθ at f.N o t i c et h a tY is a solution



















− E(µY ) − λ(E(Y ) − 1),
with µ ∈ L2





Y − µ − λ =0 P-a.s.
E(µY )=0
Y ≥ 0,µ≥ 0 P-a.s.
E(Y )=1




Y − µ − λ =0 P-a.s.
µY =0 P-a.s.













Y =0 P-a.s. (9)
Y ≥ 0 P-a.s. (10)
E[Y ]=1 (11)
Assume (Y ∗,λ
∗) satisfy (8) - (11). W.l.o.g. we can assume that (8) - (10)
are satisﬁed everywhere (not only P-a.s.).
If s ∈ {Y ∗ > 0},t h e nb y( 9 )f (s)+1




∗ − f (s)). (12)
In particular, λ
∗ −f (s) > 0,a n ds ∈ {f<λ
∗}.C o n v e r s e l y ,i fs ∈ {f<λ
∗},
then by (8) Y ∗ (s) ≥ θ(λ
∗ − f (s)) > 0 and s ∈ {Y ∗ > 0}.I ns u m ,
{Y












































∗ is unique. A fortiori, Y ∗ is unique and
Y
∗ = θ(κ − f)1 {f<κ}. (14)
By construction, the pair (Y ∗,λ
∗) deﬁned by (13) and (14) is a solution of
(8) - (11). Since the solution of (7) exists and it is unique, we conclude that
Y ∗ deﬁned as in Eq. (14) is the unique solution of (7).



















































































2P (f ≤ k) −
1
2θ









− κP (f ≤ κ)+κ







































E[f ∧ κ] −
θ
2













































P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2. It is now enough to combine Corollary 9 and Theorem
10. ¥
Remark 1 Notice that:
• Inspection of the proof of Theorem 10 shows that for all f ∈ L2 (P)








Vθ (f)=E [ f ∧ κ] −
θ
2
Var [f ∧ κ],
∇Vθ (f)=θ(κ − f)1 {f≤κ},









• The properties of gf guarantee that κ exists is unique and 1
θ = κP (f ≤ κ)− R
f1{f≤κ}dP; therefore, P (f ≤ κ) > 0.
• Moreover, 1






κ,a n ds o
∇Vθ (f)=θ(κ − f)1 {f≤κ} =
µ
1










P (f ≤ κ)








where Wα = R+α(X − R) (remember that α ∈ Rn, X ∈ L2 (P)
n,a n d~ 1 is a





P (Wα ≤ κα)




P (Wα ≤ κα)
¡
κa − E






Since for all i =1 ,...,n
∂Vθ (Wα)
∂αi
=E[ ∇Vθ (Wα)(Xi − R)],
the ﬁrst order conditions for an optimum are:





P (Wα ≤ κα)
X − θ
¡
(αX)1 {Wα≤κα}X − E[αX |Wα ≤ κα]1 {Wα≤κα}X
¢¸
=~ 1R
set A = {Wα ≤ κα} to obtain
E[X |A] − θP (A)(E[(αX)X |A] − E[X |A]E[αX |A]) =~ 1R
the observation that E[(αX)X |A]−E[X |A]E[αX |A]=V a r[ X |A]α yields:
E
h
X −~ 1R|Wα ≤ κα
i
= θP (Wα ≤ κα)V ar[X |Wα ≤ κα]α.
These are the ﬁrst n equations. The (n +1 ) - t hi st h ee q u a t i o nw h i c hd e t e r -
mines κα:




23Concavity of Vθ guarantees the suﬃciency of the ﬁrst order condition. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4. Set α∗ = α∗






















+ :E[ Y ]=1
ª
. Clearly, Y is convex and compact, and






where G(α,Y)=E [ ( R + α(X − R))Y ]+ 1
2θE[Y 2]. Moreover, notice that
G : R × Y → R is continuous, it is aﬃne in α (for each ﬁxed Y ) and strictly
convex in Y (for each ﬁxed α). Set v =m a x α∈R minY ∈Y G(α,Y),b y( a
version of) the Min-Max Theorem (e.g. [A, p. 134]) there exists ¯ Y ∈ Y such
that


































=m i n Y ∈Y G(α∗,Y), strict convexity implies ¯ Y = Y ∗.
















∗ (X − R)] = 0. (16)
Y ∗ is the solution of problem (7) in the proof of Theorem 10 with f =
R + α∗ (X − R)=Wα∗. Therefore, there exist λ
∗ ∈ R and µ ∈ L2 (P) such
that Y ∗ satisﬁes the following conditions:
R + α




∗ − µ − λ




∗ ≥ 0,µ≥ 0,µY
∗ =0 . (19)
24Taking the expectation of both sides of (17) we obtain:





∗] − E[µ] − λ
∗ =0 (20)
and, subtracting (20) from (17):
α





∗]) − (µ − E[µ]) = 0.
Rearranging and using (18):
Y
∗ =1− θα
∗ (X − E[X]) + θ(µ − E[µ]). (21)





∗Cov[µ,X]=E[ µ]+θVar [µ]. (22)
Since µ ≥ 0,t h e nE[µ] ≥ 0 thus:
α
∗ =0 ⇒ µ =0⇒ Cov[µ,X]=0 (23)
α
∗ > 0 ⇒ Cov[µ,X] ≥ 0 (24)
α
∗ < 0 ⇒ Cov[µ,X] ≤ 0 (25)
Now, plugging (21) into (16) we obtain:
E[(1− θα






























Using (23) - (25), it is now obvious that:
α























Furthermore, if P (Wα∗ > κ∗) > 0,s i n c eS is ﬁnite, there exists s such that
R + α
∗ (X (s) − R)=Wα∗ (s) > κ
∗ = λ
∗,
that is R + α∗ (X (s) − R) − λ
∗ > 0.S i n c eY ∗ (s) ≥ 0,b y( 1 7 ) ,w eh a v e
µ(s)=R + α






and E[µ] > 0. Thus, in this case (22) implies α∗Cov[µ,X] > 0 and the
inequalities in (28) and (29) become strict.
F i n a l l y ,w ew a n tt os h o wt h a tα∗α∗
mv ≥ 0. By contradiction, suppose
α∗α∗
mv < 0. Then, either α∗ > 0 and α∗
mv < 0 or α∗ < 0 and α∗
mv > 0.
Suppose α∗ > 0 and α∗









it must be E[X − R] < 0 and
α
∗E[X − R] < 0. (30)
Clearly, if α∗ < 0 and α∗
mv > 0, (30) still holds. Remember that (α∗,Y∗) is
a saddle point for












∗E[X − R] <R










which is impossible. ¥
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